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Abstract
Foundationalism in moral epistemology is a core tenet of ethical intuitionism. According to
foundationalism, somemoral beliefs (such as Ross’ list of prima facie duties) can be knownwithout
inferential justification; instead, all that is required is a proper understanding of the beliefs in
question. In an influential criticism against this view, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued that
certain psychological facts undermine the reliability of moral intuitions. He claims that
foundationalists would have to show that non-inferentially justified beliefs are not subject to those
defeaters, but this would already constitute a form of inference and hence undermine the possibility
of noninferential justification. The goal of my paper is to defend foundationalism against Sinnott-
Armstrong’s criticism. After presenting his challenge, I first argue that the most promising objection
to it fails. This objection makes the case that defeater-defeaters are not part of the justification, but
merely preserve the justification which the original claim provides. I object to this argument by
distinguishing between weak and robust defeaters; only weak defeaters, I argue, fall outside the
scope of justification, and it is an open question whether Sinnott-Armstrong’s defeaters fall into that
category. This leads the way tomy own criticism of Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge: foundationalists
inmoral epistemology are entitled to the use of defeater-defeaters as part of the justification formoral
beliefs as long as those defeater-defeaters themselves do not entail moral claims. Therefore, Sinnott-
Armstrong’s challenge does not undermine foundationalism.
Keywords Ethical intuitionism . Foundationalism.Justification .Moralepistemology.Experimental
philosophy.Defeater
1 Introduction
One of the main reasons for the revival of ethical intuitionism over the last twenty years or so has
been the development of epistemological theories which preserve the core claim of intuitionism
that at least some moral beliefs can be non-inferentially justified, but entail fewer of the
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controversial philosophical commitments which contributed to the decline of earlier intuitionism.
Three respects in which contemporary intuitionists such as Robert Audi have adopted a weaker
position than their predecessors are: First, an agent can possess self-evident moral knowledge
even if she is not aware that her beliefs are self-evident; second, to acquire the knowledge that a
proposition is self-evident, agents are allowed to make inferences as long as they merely clarify
the meaning of the proposition in question and do not rely on external premises; and third, even
though self-evidence is sufficient for justifying a proposition, this does not exclude the possibility
of additional forms of justification for the same proposition (see Audi 2004: 40–54).
Despite these concessions, “moderate intuitionism” has failed to convince many of its critics.
This is because its core claim, foundationalism in epistemology, is often also considered its core
problem.1 According to foundationalism, there are moral propositions which are such that in
virtue of understanding them, “one is justified in believing the proposition […]—this explains
why such a truth is evident in itself. Second, if one believes the proposition on the basis of that
understanding, then one knows it.”2
What makes foundationalism attractive is that it offers a solution to the problem of how moral
beliefs can be justified. If a belief’s justification depends on other beliefs which also stand in need
of justification, there looms the threat of an infinite regress or a justificatory circle.3 In response to
this problem, non-inferential justification functions as a regress stopper. According to intuitionists,
fundamental moral obligations such as the prima facie duties of veracity, benevolence or
reparation serve as fixed points in our normative framework which do not stand in need of further
justification and from which our duties in a concrete situation can be derived.
Many have taken issue with this claim. There are two ways in which critics have attacked the
possibility of non-inferential justification. On conceptual grounds, the case can be made that the
idea of foundationalism is incoherent or stands in tension with other plausible beliefs. Alterna-
tively, many attack foundationalism on empirical grounds, with arguments to the effect that certain
psychological facts undermine the reliability of our intuitions, and this makes non-inferential
justification impossible.4 Over the past ten years, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has put forward a
version of the second kind of criticism in a series of publications.5
The goal of this paper is to defend foundationalism against Sinnott-Armstrong’s criticism.
After presenting his argument (section 2), I argue that the most promising objection to it fails
(sections 3 and 4). This leads the way to my own criticism (section 5), which should not only
1 Besides foundationalism in epistemology, a second core claim of ethical intuitionism is non-naturalist realism
(an exception is A. C. Ewing, who holds the first and third core claim of intuitionism, but rejects in his later work
moral realism). Third, many but not all intuitionists defend ethical pluralism. While classical intuitionism is
usually understood as the combination of these three claims, they can be held independently.
2 Audi (2004: 48f.); see also Audi (1999: 206) and (2008). For Ross’s conception of self-evidence, see Ross
(1930: 20 fn. 1 and 29f). Other defenders of foundationalist moral epistemology include Shafer-Landau (2003:
247) and Stratton-Lake (2002: 18–23). It has been argued, e.g. by Huemer (2005: 106) , that intuitions are
intellectual seemings, not self-evident beliefs. In what follows, I will limit my discussion to self-evidence
accounts since this is the explicit target of Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge to intuitionism.
3 See Sinnott-Armstrong (2006b: 74–77). The problem of course extends beyond morality, but the focus of this
paper is on the case of moral beliefs.
4 Insofar as any ethical theory needs to account for the epistemic justification of moral beliefs, the problem raised
by Sinnott-Armstrong is not limited to intuitionism: if an epistemic regress, circular forms of justification and
foundationalism are the only options for solving this task, the claim that foundationalism lacks plausibility limits
the options for all ethical theories. This is, however, especially problematic for intuitionism, because
intuitionism—as traditionally understood—is tied to foundationalism.
5 See Sinnott-Armstrong (2002), (2006a), (2006b: ch. 9), (2008) and (2011). Unless indicated otherwise, I will
focus on the latest formulation of his argument.
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result in a better understanding of the epistemology that intuitionism is committed to, but also
contribute to the debate about the nature of defeaters and defeater-defeaters.
2 Sinnott-Armstrong’s Argument against Foundationalism
In linewith Ross andAudi, Sinnott-Armstrong takes foundationalism inmoral epistemology to hold
that moral agents can be justified in believing at least some moral beliefs non-inferentially, i.e.
“regardless of whether the believer is committed to any justificatory inferential structure” which he
defines as “a set of propositions where some propositions provide epistemic support for others”
(Sinnott-Armstrong 2011: 13). The claim is not merely that the agent need not actually go through
an inference (even if she is in possession of a justificatory inferential structure for the moral belief in
question), but the stronger requirement that an agent can be justified even without having a
disposition to accept a justificatory inferential structure.
Sinnott-Armstrong questions this assumption. He does not do so by arguing that non-
inferential justification is an incoherent or misconceived idea (the first strategy mentioned
above). Instead, he takes an indirect route: he attempts to show that empirical evidence against
the reliability of moral judgments in general makes it impossible to claim that a subgroup of
these judgments is foundationally justified. That is, even if non-inferential justification turns
out to be a viable epistemic tool for other kinds of beliefs, the specific features of moral belief
formation undermine the applicability of such justification in the moral realm.
Here is Sinnott-Armstrong’s case for the empirically informed premise of his argument: Awide
range of experiments from empirical moral psychology leave little doubt that people’s moral
judgments are affected by non-truth-tracking factors such as implicit biases and emotions. For
example, people are partial towards their friends, peer group or race; emotions such as disgust or fear
can interfere with moral deliberations, and so does our general mood; and the order in which people
are asked to assess ethically relevant situations and the way that statistical information is presented
make a difference to their judgments (see Sinnott-Armstrong 2011: 43–46). Even if those and many
other factors do not apply to all of our ethical judgments, Sinnott-Armstrong claims that in their
totality they provide evidence that a significant percentage of ourmoral judgments are distorted. The
existence of these factors does not prove that the judgments which are affected by them are wrong,
but the fact that they exercise an influence on moral deliberation undermines the trustworthiness of
moral judgments in general. This is a problem for intuitionists insofar as foundationalismmust claim
that at least those judgments that are supposed to be non-inferentially justified are worthy of our
trust.
In response, can’t the intuitionist accept with Sinnott-Armstrong that we have reason to doubt
many of our moral beliefs, but argue against him that the moral judgments intuitionism takes to be
self-evident are the outcome of a reliable epistemic process (such as repeated careful deliberation
involving mental maturity and the absence of strong emotions)? The strategy of this response is to
divide the class of moral judgments into two subgroups: The first subgroup consists of all those
moral judgments where psychological defeaters are prevalent andwhose credence is cast into doubt,
while a second and presumably much smaller subgroup contains privileged judgments that are the
result of a reliable belief-forming process which excludes the distorting influences that characterize
the members of the first subgroup. They therefore satisfy higher epistemic standards.
Foundationalists could claim that self-evident beliefs belong to the second subgroup.
To block such a move, Sinnott-Armstrong introduces two epistemic principles. First, he argues
that if a belief A falls into a group of beliefs B that possess a property Cwith a certain likelihood, our
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default assumption should be that belief A has the same chance as any other belief in group B of
having property C. If one wants to claim that belief A falls into another group D with a higher or
lower chance of having property C, one needs provide evidence for that claim. By doing so, one
makes use of a justificatory inferential structure as part of the overall justification (see Sinnott-
Armstrong 2011: 48). This sounds plausible: If I happen to know that the vast majority of pocket
watches show the wrong time and I encounter a random pocket watch, I should assume that it is
inaccurate unless I can confirm that this particular one is more reliable than most other pocket
watches. Sinnott-Armstrong’s second epistemic principle is that if one has reason to conclude that a
certain belief might with a certain likelihood bewrong, then one is not justified inmaintaining it (see
Sinnott-Armstrong 2011: 50).
This confronts the intuitionist with a dilemma. On its first horn, the moral judgments that are the
source of self-evident beliefs are subject to psychological defeaters to the same extent as most other
moral judgments (i.e. they belong to the first subgroup) and are therefore not trustworthy. Thus, we
should suspend judgment regarding their truth. On the second horn, the intuitionist might claim that
self-evident moral beliefs fall into the second subgroup and are therefore more reliable than other
moral judgments. But it then follows from the first epistemic principle that such a claim stands in
need of inferential justification and is therefore incompatible with foundationalism (see Sinnott-
Armstrong 2011: 55–57).
The upshot is that given the empirical evidence that many of our moral intuitions have a
significant chance of being false, there can be no non-inferentially justified moral belief; this
undermines the possibility of a foundationalist moral epistemology and thereby questions the
plausibility of one of the pillars of ethical intuitionism.
While some philosophers support Sinnott-Armstrong’s attack on foundationalism,6 his argument
has also provoked a number of critical responses. Here I will focus on what seems to me the most
forceful argument against it to date.7 Variations on this argument have been offered in a number of
places.8 In what follows, I will only discuss the version brought forward by Ballantyne and Thurow
(2013), but I believe that my comments also apply to other formulations of the argument.
3 Ballantyne and Thurow’s Argument against Sinnott-Armstrong
Nathan Ballantyne and Joshua Thurow concede to Sinnott-Armstrong that psychological factors
undermine the trustworthiness of moral judgments in general. Against Sinnott-Armstrong, however,
they make the case that the presence of these factors does not speak against the possibility of non-
inferential justification. To this end, they introduce an example to help analyse the relationship in
which the various beliefs that are relevant for the justification of a non-inferentially justified belief
stand to one another. This allows them to argue that exclusion of distorting psychological factors can
be accomplished without thereby adding to the justification of a belief and hence without
undermining foundationalism. Here is their example (“case 1”):
6 His argument has, among others, been defended by Joyce (2006: 216–219) and Naddelhoffer and Feltz (2008) .
7 There is a popular strand of criticism that I will leave aside for now but will return to in the last section. It targets
Sinnott-Armstrong’s empirical assumption, making the case that the psychological defeaters as he presents them
provide insufficient grounds for undermining the justification of non-inferentially held moral beliefs.
8 See Tolhurst (2008: 81f.), Tropman (2011: 364f.) and Ballantyne and Thurow (2013: 414). The argument has
also been embraced by Stratton-Lake (2016).
P. Schwind
McCoy visits the local widget factory and sees what seems to be a red widget being carried
along a conveyor belt. He believes that the widget is red (call this belief “B”). Soon enough, a
stranger approaches McCoy and says that the widgets are actually white but are illuminated
by red lights. (Call this event “D”.) Upon seeing this conversation, another stranger—who
seems toMcCoy to be a factory employee—tells McCoy not to listen to the other stranger: he
is a trickster, McCoy is told, who likes to mess around with visitors. (Call this second event
“F”.) (Ballantyne and Thurow 2013: 413)
First, McCoy has a sensory experience which provides him with non-inferential justification for his
belief B. His justification is, however, undermined by a defeater D which McCoy in turn calls into
question by employing the defeater-defeater F. The notion of a defeater that is at play here is defined
as follows:
R is a defeater for P as a prima facie reason for Q if and only if P is a reason for S to
believe Q and R is logically consistent with P but (P & R) is not a reason for S to believe
Q.9
In accordancewith this definition, the stranger’s objection (D) is consistent withMcCoy’s belief (B),
but McCoy’s original reason for believing B—his visual evidence—counts no longer in favor of B
once the defeater is taken into account.
Based on this interpretation of the example, Ballantyne andThurow argue that B is “supported by
experiences or seemings alone” (Ballantyne and Thurow 2013: 414). The defeater-defeater only
targets the defeater “without giving evidence for thinking B is true or that B was reliably formed”.
Therefore, F preserves the justification for B, but it does not support it. The factors that had justified
B prior to the occurrence of the defeater continue to do so once the defeater-defeater is in place. This,
Ballantyne and Thurow argue, makes room for the claim that the defeater-defeater is not part of a
justificatory inferential structure supporting B.
Since Sinnott-Armstrong’s criticism only targets the claim that the justification for our moral
beliefs can be non-inferential, Ballantyne and Thurow argue that based on the foregoing distinction,
there is no tension between the claim that the explanation that a given belief is not subject to a
defeater is based on inferences and the claim that the justification itself is non-inferential. This is
because the production and the preservation of justification are separate functions, and the fact that
the latter is based on inferences does not imply that the former is as well.
4 An Objection to Ballantyne and Thurow
In order for Ballantyne and Thurow’s argument to succeed, not onlymust their interpretation of case
1 be plausible, but their claim that defeater-defeaters are not part of the justification must generalize
and extend to other cases, in particular to those involving moral judgments. I want to argue that this
second assumption is false. While it seems correct that in the scenario introduced in the last section,
the defeater-defeater falls outside the scope of the justification, there is an alternative explanation for
9 Pollock (1987: 484); see also Pollock and Crutz (1986: 37). Ballantyne and Thurow adopt Pollock’s under-
standing of the term (See Ballantyne and Thurow (2013: 412f)). Note that Pollock uses the term “prima facie” in
a way that differs from intuitionists like Ross. For Pollock, it means “defeasible” insofar as “further information
can make us withdraw” support for the claim that P is a reason for Q. For Ross, a prima facie duty is a
consideration that would be the duty all things considered (or ‘duty proper’), if it was the only relevant
consideration. In the presence of other considerations, it can be outweighed, even though it remains a reason.
See Ross (1930: 19f).
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why this is the case. This alternative explanation is sensitive to the kind of defeater that is brought
forward against a certain belief, and in the cases of moral beliefs that Sinnott-Armstrong is interested
in, it is an open question whether defeater-defeaters fall within or outside of the scope of the
justification. If correct, this would serve as a rejoinder to Ballantyne and Thurow’s argument.
To begin with, there are two features that can be ascribed to the defeater in case 1. First, the
defeater does not originate from a reliable or authoritative source but rather comes from a “stranger”
who is described as a “trickster […] who likes to mess around with visitors”.10 Second, the defeater
as presented lacks intrinsic plausibility—absent further explanation, it seems implausible that the
widgets would be illuminated just to fool the color perceptions of strangers. We can call defeaters of
this sort “weak”. In contrast to weak defeaters, robust defeaters (i) originate from a reliable and
authoritative source and (ii) are intrinsically plausible.11 While the defeaters that are relevant in the
present context are, in both their weak and robust variants, aimed at undermining the reason in favor
of the belief in question, they differ regarding their credibility.12Aweak source and a lack of intrinsic
plausibility detract from the credibility of a defeater and give less compelling reason to take it
seriously, while defeaters that originate from a trustworthy source and are intrinsically plausible have
the opposite effect.13 The following example (case 2) illustrates what counts as a robust defeater:
At night, Alice steps outside of her house, looks at the dark sky and believes that she sees
Epsilon Indi, one of the smallest stars visible to the naked eye (“H’”). But as her friend and
long-time stargazer Stella reminds her, the sky above their town has been under a thick cloud
of fog for years, due to a nearby coal-burning power plant. She adds that this makes it very
unlikely that a star the size of Epsilon Indi could be detected (“J’”). The following day, Alice
reads in the newspaper that yesterday, the power plant had to be shut down due to an
unexpected temporary malfunction and that consequently, the night sky had been clear
(“L’”).
In contrast to McCoy and the trickster in case 1, Alice has reason to trust her well-informed friend
Stella. Additionally, the defeater is plausible: neither the existence of the power plant nor the fact
that coal-burning power plants cause foggy skies and are therefore bad for stargazing are in doubt.
If Alice wanted to justify to her neighbour her belief that she has seen Epsilon Indi, what would
we expect her to include as part of her justification? —certainly, her visual experience, but if she
were to stop there, this would not suffice to convince her interlocutor, who is also familiar with the
10 Ballantyne and Thurow’s description downplays the credibility of the source of the defeater more than most
typical descriptions of the same example. In Plantinga (2000: 359), it is the shop superintendent who brings
forward the defeater, and in Evans and Smith (2013: 359) , it is the factory owner. If my own account (see below)
is correct, the way the defeater is characterized matters for the intuition Ballantyne and Thurow are trying to
elicit, and it is not an accident that they characterize the source of the defeater in the way they do.
11 These two criteria are not meant to be exhaustive, as I have a more limited goal: to demonstrate that two
factors—the trustworthiness of the source and the intrinsic plausibility of the defeater—play a role (an important
one) in determining how credible a defeater is. Other factors, such as the question of howmany of my firmly held
beliefs would be affected if the defeater were true or whether the defeater holds true in many nearby possible
worlds, might have to be added for a complete account of the distinction between robust and weak defeaters.
12 It is also possible for defeaters to be weak in the sense that they only slightly affect the likelihood of the reason
in favor of the belief being true, rather than aiming at undermining it completely. As an example, in case 1, the
defeater could state that only once per month or even only once per year, the factory is illuminated by red lights.
This counts as a defeater, but as one that, if true, would not significantly undermine the justification in favor of
seeing a red widget. Here, I am only concerned with defeaters that are not weak in terms of their content but
rather aim at dealing a full blow to the reason in favor of the belief.
13 It is of course possible that some defeaters fall into the middle of the spectrum. Here, I only want to argue that
there are clear cases of weak and robust defeaters.
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smog caused by the local power plant but probably has not heard about the plant’s temporary shut-
down. For this reason, Alice should also mention the unusually favourable circumstances under
which her observation took place.14 However, this stands in contrast to the intuition that case 1
elicits. What explains this difference?
Merely pointing towards the different kinds of defeaters in cases 1 and 2 does not yet explainwhy
weak defeaters seem—at least in the cases under consideration—to lead to a narrow-scope
justification, whereas robust defeaters result in wide-scope justifications. For this purpose, we must
go beyond the defeaters and consider their function within the larger context of justification.
Being justified is a favorable evaluative status for a specific belief which consists of consider-
ations that make it plausible that the belief in question is true. A justification fails in its purpose if it
does not establish this claim. In the same vein, Laurence Bonjour argues that
if finding epistemically justified beliefs did not substantially increase the likelihood of finding
true ones, then epistemic justification would be irrelevant to our main cognitive goal and of
dubious worth. It is only if we have some reason for thinking that epistemic justification
constitutes a path to truth that we as cognitive beings have any motive for preferring
epistemically justified beliefs to epistemically unjustified ones (Bonjour 1985: 8).
Reasons in favor of the belief as well as considerations which ensure that those reasons are not
undermined contribute towards the goal of demonstrating that a belief is likely to be true.15 In the
presence of defeaters, neither the reasons that would in isolation have supported the belief nor the
defeater-defeaters are taken by themselves to be capable of turning an unjustified belief into a
justified belief. It is only their conjunction that achieves this purpose, and hence, both elements
should count as part of the justification. However, this claim calls for a qualification: as it stands, it
does not account for the different intuitions behind cases 1 and 2. The reason is that as long as
defeaters with low credibility have not been discounted, all defeaters would have to be addressed
with equal urgency since each of themwould, if undefeated, significantly affect the likelihood of the
belief being true.
This would lead to ramifications that extend beyond the problem of explaining our intuitions in a
few isolated scenarios. Given the large number of defeaters that could be raised for each situation,
14 If, however, this is a fact that is well-known both to Alice and to her interlocuter, then there is no point in
including the defeater-defeater as part of the justification.
15 Some philosophers such as William Alston have drawn a distinction between the concept of being justified in
believing p (i.e. the state of being justified in a belief) and the concept of justifying p (i.e. the activity of justifying
a belief), arguing that it is important to keep them apart for the following reason: “The crucial difference between
them is that while to justify a belief is to marshal considerations in its support, in order for one to be justified in
believing that p it is not necessary that one have done anything by way of an argument for p or for one’s
epistemic situation vis-à-vis p. Unless one is justified in many beliefs without arguing for them, there is precious
little one can justifiably believe” (Alston 1991: 71). For intuitionists like Ross on the other hand, the state of
being justified in believing prima facie duties seems tied to the process by which we come to believe them; it is
doubtful whether agents who have not undergone this process would also count as justified. This process can take
various forms, for example, careful reflection on the meaning of a prima facie duty or the observation of various
instantiations of the breach of this duty (‘intuitive induction’). From this, we come to the conclusion that part of
the meaning of, say, promise breaking is that it is prima facie wrong (see Ross (1930: 34–39)). However, this
does not lead to the consequence that there would be “preciously little one can justifiably believe”: first, Ross’
focus is not on the totality of beliefs; this leaves it open how justification works for other kinds of beliefs. Second,
given the centrality of basic moral beliefs and their place in life, most competent agents will naturally go through
the process of intuitive induction (and at least some will reflect on their normative commitments as they mature).
Hence, even regarding the subgroup of basic moral beliefs, most agents will count as justified on Ross’ theory.
For the stronger claim that, in most cases, “being justified” should not be separated from the activity of
justification, see Almeder (1999: 92). I thank two anonymous referees for raising this issue.
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justificationswhich have to address all of themwould be enormously large and complex,making the
concept worthless for its practical purpose: It would be impossible for finite beings to justify most of
their beliefs in this way.16 The qualification that is needed in order to address this problem limits the
defeaters that need to be taken into account to those which would, in the eyes of what Quinn calls
“intellectually sophisticated adults” (see Quinn 1985: 482), substantially affect the likelihood of the
belief’s being true and hence reduce its credibility below the threshold required for justification. This
excludes any highly dubious considerations which—despite the fact that they would, if true,
undermine the evidence in favor of the belief—lack a sufficient degree of credibility. However
one fills out the notion of intellectually sophisticated adults (or “mature adults” in Ross’ terminol-
ogy), as long as they need to assess the credibility of objections to their belief, something akin to the
distinction between weak and robust defeaters will be part of their mental toolset.
The position according towhichweak defeaters fall outside the scope of justificationwhile robust
defeaters are part of it enjoys two advantages: it addresses the difference in intuition between cases 1
and 2—in the first case, the defeater is weak, while in the second, it is strong—and it does so while
offering an explanation that is not ad hoc: Given the purpose of justification, only credible factors
should be addressed.
For Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument to succeed, then, it must be the case that there are robust
defeaters which (as long as they remain undefeated) undermine support for the justification of moral
judgments. If the psychological defeaters are–as in Ballantyne and Thurow’s example–of the weak
kind, they will play no role in the justification of moral beliefs, and foundationalists will win the day.
But whether or not this is so is a substantive question on its own that has to be solved by looking at
the content and the source of those defeaters. It cannot be argued from the start—as Ballantyne and
Thurow suggest—that for formal reasons, defeaters for psychological defeaters are always and
necessarily excluded from the scope of the justification for moral beliefs. If Sinnott-Armstrong’s
argument fails (and below I will argue that it does), this will be for different reasons.
5 Why Defeater-Defeaters Pose no Problem for Foundationalism, Even if
they Are Part of the Justification for Moral Beliefs
Now that we have reason to assume that defeater-defeaters can be part of the justification for
moral beliefs, friends of foundationalism have two main options.17 First, they can argue that
16 To count as a defeater, there is no need for it to actually be raised for each situation where it applies. It is
sufficient that an intellectually sophisticated adult should, upon reflection, be aware that it could be raised. This
includes all sorts of conspiracy theories, far-fetched skeptical scenarios and countless other defeaters.
17 There are other ways to criticize Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument which I will, however, leave aside. For
example, one could distinguish between concrete beliefs about particular situations and general beliefs about
principles and make the case that only concrete beliefs are susceptible to psychological defeaters. This would
leave general beliefs such as the prima facie duty of benevolence untarnished by Sinnott-Armstrong’s attack.
Since the category into which a moral belief falls is clear from the start, there is no need for inferential
confirmation. This line of argument can be traced to Ross, who argues that we can ascribe certainty only to
abstract principles and that our judgments in concrete cases are “more or less probable opinions” (1930: 31.). A
similar move is described by MacIntyre when he discusses how Calvinists in the seventeenth century were
worried that fallible human beings could not know with certainty that God exists. The solution was to distinguish
between concrete judgments regarding everyday objects and a privileged group of judgments about abstract
matters. In virtue of being abstract, the latter group of judgments was considered less fallible (MacIntyre 1988:
241–259). I thank […] for raising this issue. Yet another reply to Sinnott-Armstrong can be found in van Roojen
(2014), who argues that some moral beliefs could be justified in virtue of their non-inferential plausibility in
addition to coherentist considerations.
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the empirical evidence Sinnott-Armstrong provides is insufficient and does not undermine the
trustworthiness of our moral intuitions. A number of critics have argued along these lines,18
and while it is certainly a legitimate way to question Sinnott-Armstrong’s case, there remains a
serious drawback to this strategy: Even if successful, arguments of this kind are vulnerable to
new and more conclusive studies which provide better evidence.19 Given that all that skeptics
of the reliability of moral judgments need is a cumulative case which shows that in their
totality, psychological defeaters of various sorts cast doubt on the trustworthiness of moral
intuitions, one might worry that, over time, a still more substantive body of data will emerge
and make that reply seem less and less plausible. It would therefore be unwise for
foundationalists to place all their bets on this first strategy. In what follows, I will therefore
assume that the psychological defeaters Sinnott-Armstrong presents are of the robust kind and
undermine, if no defeater-defeaters can be found against them, our trust in moral judgments.
I want to pursue a second option in defense of foundationalism. It accepts not only that the
psychological defeaters Sinnott-Armstrong presents need to be addressed before
foundationalist moral beliefs can be justified, but also goes further than Ballantyne and
Thurow in granting that defeater-defeaters provide inferential support in favor of the moral
beliefs in question. Despite these concessions, I believe that foundationalism in moral episte-
mology remains a viable position that solves the regress-problem and avoids coherentist forms
of justification or the reduction of moral to non-moral beliefs. I will address these challenges in
turn.
The immediate worry this position raises is that it fails to address the main problem raised
by Sinnott-Armstrong: If foundationalists employ defeater-defeaters in order to undermine
psychological defeaters, the justification involves inferential processes. This seems to corre-
spond to the problem brought up by the second horn of Sinnott-Armstrong’s dilemma.20
However, there are two ways in which inferential processes could be taken to be problematic
for foundationalism. First, it could be said that according to foundationalism, the justification
base must not consist of beliefs which provide inferential support for foundational moral
beliefs. Merely self-evident beliefs which, once they have been properly understood, provide
immediate evidence for their content, may be part of the justification for foundational moral
beliefs. Some of what Sinnott-Armstrong says can be taken to lend support to such a position,
for example when he defines his target as the view that “the believer is justified regardless of
whether the believer is committed to any justificatory inferential structure” (Sinnott-Armstrong
(2011: 40; see also 38). A second way to interpret foundationalism in moral epistemology is
that no element that is part of the justification base must stand itself in need of inferential
justification. Here, the focus is on the epistemic status of the elements that are part of the
justification base and not on their function regarding the justification of the belief in question.
At some places, it seems that it is this second view that Sinnott-Armstrong has in mind, for
example when he argues that the kind of non-inferentiality that ethical intuitionism “requires
that the believer would still be justified even if the believer did not have as much as a
disposition to accept any propositions that are, entail, or support any propositions that provide
epistemic support for what is believed” (40; see also 41 and his Sinnott-Armstrong 2006b:
184–191). The concern that is expressed here is not with the idea that there might be various
18 Demaree-Cotton (2016), Smith (2010), Tolhurst (2008), and Shafer-Landau (2008) (even though this is not the
main thrust of Shafer-Landau’s argument).
19 See, for example, Naddelhoffer and Feltz (2008), who identify additional cognitive biases to which moral
judgments are subject and who argue that this strengthens Sinnott-Armstrong’s case.
20 I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify this issue.
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kinds of considerations which support a certain belief, but with the question of whether these
considerations stand themselves in need of justification. What makes the second interpretation
look more plausible is the overall question foundationalists are trying to address. This becomes
clear when Sinnott-Armstrong argues that views which deny the claim just quoted are “not
enough stop the skeptical regress, opposition to which motivates many moral intuitionists”
(40). If the second interpretation of foundationalism is correct, the second horn of Sinnott-
Armstrong’s dilemma has to be read in light of it. It hence raises the worry that the
employment of defeater-defeaters in response to psychological defeaters contradicts
foundationalism insofar as those defeater-defeaters stand themselves in need of justification
and fail to put a stop to the regress.
The question is whether the proposed solution – namely, that defeater-defeaters provide
inferential support for foundational moral beliefs – is vulnerable to this objection. At first sight,
this seems to be the case. After all, beliefs regarding defeater-defeaters (e.g. the belief that the
process of reflection has not been subject to emotional distortions or partiality) are empirical
and stand in need of further justification. It therefore appears that the thread of a regress has not
been averted. However, ethical intuitionists can reply that the challenge they are addressing is
limited to a skepticism regarding the justification of certain moral beliefs. There is no need for
them to take on more philosophical baggage than necessary and to address issues outside their
scope such as the justification of non-moral beliefs. While defending the possibility of non-
inferential justification for moral beliefs, proponents of foundationalism are not even commit-
ted to an agnostic stance regarding the justification of belief in empirical facts; instead, they
should simply be allowed to take for granted that other kinds of true beliefs can be justified in
some non-problematic way.
This view entails nothing that classical intuitionists or more recent proponents of ethical
intuitionism should find difficult to accept. Ross believes that we only come to know self-
evident truths as the result of a cumulative process of deliberation that stretches over many
generations (1930: 41). In order to assess which of the ideas that others have come up with are
worth pursuing and which would better be disregarded, we would have to identify biases,
prejudices and other sorts of bad thinking, and this involves non-moral premises. In Audi’s
definition of self-evidence quoted at the beginning, it is “in virtue of understanding” that an
agent gains justification. Audi explicitly rules out “clouded” or “distorted” forms of under-
standing (Audi 2004: 49 and Audi 1999: 207). This includes not only cognitive shortcomings
such as a mistaken understanding of what is logically implied by a proposition, but also
“biased background beliefs” (Audi 2008: 16). The requirement that agents need, as part of their
justification for self-evident beliefs, to exclude psychological defeaters therefore also does not
stand in tension with Audi’s views on foundationalism.
The assumption that the justifiability of non-moral premises has to be taken for granted is
also compatible with Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge to intuitionism. Not only that, but while
adopting a skeptical standpoint regarding moral beliefs, Sinnott-Armstrong even presupposes
that propositions about empirical facts can be justified. After all, if the justification for true
empirical claims leads to an epistemic regress, this would also affect the premises regarding the
psychological defeaters which Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument is built upon. Hence, proponents
of his challenge to intuitionism need to reject skepticism regarding the justifiability of
empirical beliefs. But if empirical beliefs raise no epistemological difficulties, shouldn’t
foundationalists by extension also be allowed to employ empirical assumptions to exclude
the presence of psychological defeaters? As just argued, proponents of Sinnott-Armstrong’s
challenge are in no position to make the case that employing those assumptions leads to an
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epistemic regress. Or, perhaps, does the use of defeater-defeaters instead invite the charge that
foundationalists are deriving moral from non-moral beliefs?
In response to this worry, the function of the defeater-defeaters that are relevant in the
present context is to enable considerations that speak in favor of a moral belief—e.g. that lying
is prima facie wrong—to retain their reason-giving force despite the presence of defeaters
which would otherwise undermine them. Hence, no normative conclusions regarding morality
can be derived from the defeater-defeaters.21 As I have shown above, this does not contradict
the claim that they belong to an inferential structure which as a whole justifies the normative
belief in question.
Consequently, intuitionists can help themselves to defeater-defeaters while (a) upholding
the claim that some moral beliefs are non-inferentially justified and (b) avoiding the charge of
an epistemic regress or derivation of moral from non-moral beliefs.
Once intuitionists are licensed to use defeater-defeaters to strengthen the credibility of
moral intuitions, they are in a position to demonstrate that the defeaters Sinnott-Armstrong
introduces do not apply to all moral beliefs; cases where defeater-defeaters are available might,
for example, include those found on Ross’s list of prima facie duties. In fact, the limitations
that Ross imposes on candidates for self-evident moral beliefs such as mature agency and
careful reflection (see Ross 1939: 21) can be read as umbrella terms that encompass all
defeater-defeaters which are necessary to deal with the kind of psychological defeaters that
Sinnott-Armstrong discusses.22
This casts into doubt Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument that intuitionism is incompatible with
an inferential structure. Non-normative premises which are not used to derive normative
beliefs but which establish the absence of psychological defeaters do play a crucial role in
the process of justification, but they do not undermine the status of justification as non-
inferential in the sense intended by the foundationalist: No regress occurs since the
foundationalist is entitled to assume that non-normative premises can be justified. The burden
of showing how this can be done, however, rests on somebody else’s shoulders.
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